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[1] Status quo analysis algorithms developed within the paradigm of the graph model for
conflict resolution are applied to an international river basin conflict involving the United
States and Canada to assess the likeliness of various compromise resolutions. The
conflict arose because the state of Montana feared that further expansion of the Sage Creek
Coal Company facilities in Canada would pollute the Flathead River, which flows from
British Columbia to Montana. Significant insights not generally available from a static
stability analysis are obtained about potential resolutions of the conflict under study and
about how decision makers’ interactions may direct the conflict to distinct resolutions.
Analyses also show how political considerations may affect a particular decision maker’s
choice, thereby influencing the evolution of the conflict. INDEX TERMS: 1899 Hydrology:
General or miscellaneous; 1871 Hydrology: Surface water quality; 6309 Policy Sciences: Decision making
under uncertainty; KEYWORDS: conflict analysis, graph model for conflict resolution, status quo analysis,
water resources conflict
Citation: Li, K. W., D. M. Kilgour, and K. W. Hipel (2004), Status quo analysis of the Flathead River conflict, Water Resour. Res.,
40, W05S03, doi:10.1029/2003WR002596.
1. Introduction
[2] Continuing growth in demand for freshwater around
the globe raises concerns about the sustainability of water
resources utilization [Gleick, 2002]. Competing uses of
relatively scarce freshwater resources create conflicts at
all levels of governance [Dimitrov, 2002; Froukh, 2003;
Kuylenstierna et al., 1997; Mostert, 1998]. Transboundary
water resources conflicts have received substantial attention
across a wide array of research traditions, such as geogra-
phy [Giordano et al., 2002; Wolf, 1997, 2002], environ-
mental studies [Conca and Dabelko, 2003; Dimitrov, 2002],
law [International Bureau of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, 2003], policy and political science [Just and
Netanyahu, 1998], water resources management [Kilgour
and Dinar, 2001; Nandalal and Simonovic, 2002], and
systems engineering [Hipel et al., 1997].
[3] This paper takes an engineering perspective and treats
a transboundary water dispute as a strategic conflict among
different interest groups. In a strategic conflict, different
interest groups can be modeled as decision makers (DMs),
where each DM is able to make its choice unilaterally and the
combinations of choices of all DMs together determine the
possible outcomes of the conflict. In general, DMs’ interests
and objectives conflict, and they are reflected in DMs’
preferences over possible outcomes. A variety of methodol-
ogies has been proposed to handle strategic conflicts, includ-
ing metagame analysis [Howard, 1971], hypergame analysis
[Bennett, 1980; Wang et al., 1988], conflict analysis [Fraser
and Hipel, 1984], the graph model for conflict resolution
[Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993], drama theory
[Howard, 1999], and the theory of moves [Brams, 1994]
and its fuzzy counterpart, the theory of fuzzy moves [Zhang
and Kandel, 1997; Li et al., 2001]. As Kilgour [1995] points
out, an essential commonality of these approaches is their
‘‘game-theoretic roots.’’ K. Hipel (Conflict resolution:
Theme overview paper in conflict resolution in Encyclopedia
of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), 2002, http://www.eolss.
net) provides an overview of approaches to conflict resolu-
tion developed in a range of fields such as sociology,
psychology, political science, business, management scien-
ces, operational research, and systems engineering.
[4] Among these approaches to conflict analysis the
graph model for conflict resolution is conceived to be a
simple but efficient decision aid tool for analyzing conflict
and providing structural insights [Fang et al., 1993]. The
graph model takes states (possible outcomes of the conflict),
instead of individual DM’s choices, as basic components
and tracks DMs’ moves and countermoves among feasible
states. Preference information is taken into account when a
stability analysis is conducted. Stability of a state is assessed
at both individual and aggregate levels: a state is deemed
stable for a particular DM if this DM has no incentive to
deviate from the state; a state constitutes an equilibrium if
all DMs find it to be stable. The notion of stability here is
general; there is a range of ways to define it, including Nash
stability [Nash, 1950a, 1950b, 1951], general metaration-
ality (GMR)[Howard, 1971], symmetric metarationality
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(SMR) [Howard, 1971], sequential stability [Fraser and
Hipel, 1979, 1984], limited move stability (Lh, h > 1)
[Kilgour, 1985; Zagare, 1984], and nonmyopic stability
[Brams and Wittman, 1981; Kilgour, 1984]. These different
stability definitions are referred to as solution concepts in
the graph model [Fang et al., 1993]. Solution concepts are
designed to describe human behavior patterns in conflict,
and Fang et al. [1989] examine the interrelationships of the
graph model solution concepts. Naturally, the more solution
concepts under which a state is an equilibrium, the more
likely this state is to point to a resolution of the conflict
under study. The graph model has been implemented in the
decision support system (DSS) GMCR II [Peng, 1999;
Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b], which can
carry out stability analyses expeditiously when necessary
inputs are provided and hence dramatically enhance the
applicability of this decision tool [Hipel et al., 2001;
Kilgour et al., 2001].
[5] When a strategic conflict is modeled, a point in time
has to be specified. In the graph model the initial state of the
conflict is referred to as the status quo. Although a static
stability analysis can predict individual stability and overall
equilibrium information, thereby suggesting where the con-
flict may settle (presumably, one of the predicted equilibria),
the accessibility of these predicted resolutions remains
unexplored. Status quo analysis [Peng, 1999; Li et al.,
2002; Li, 2003; Li et al., 2003] addresses concerns about
the reachability of any specified state from the status quo
and examines evolutionary aspects of conflict. Status quo
analysis can expeditiously determine whether a state is
attainable from the status quo and yield significant insights
on how a DM should act or interact with other DMs to
direct a conflict to a desired achievable resolution. Since the
graph model introduces the notion of irreversible moves
(DMs can cause the conflict to move in one direction but
not the other) to reflect no-return decisions, the reachability
of a state from a status quo is not automatically guaranteed.
If some of the moves are specified as irreversible at the
modeling stage, it is possible that some of the predicted
resolutions cannot be attained from the status quo state, and
an analyst may safely eliminate such states from the
potential resolution list and concentrate on a refined list.
Therefore it is important to carry out status quo analysis and
to investigate the dynamic evolution of a conflict.
[6] Section 2 describes our approach to status quo anal-
ysis. In section 3 the methodology is applied to the Flathead
River conflict, a transboundary water resources manage-
ment dispute between the United States and Canada. The
paper concludes with some comments in section 4.
2. Status Quo Analysis
[7] A conflict model in the graph form consists of a
collection of sets: DMs set N, feasible states set S, and
directed graphs set {Di = (S, Ai), i 2 N}, where Di is a
directed graph to depict available moves in one step among
states in S for DM i and Ai includes all directed arcs in Di
characterizing such moves, and relative preference rankings
on S, which are characterized by a pair of binary relations,
strict preference, and indifference, {i, i}. Algebraically,
Di can be described by the notion of a reachable list, which
includes all states reachable in one step from a specific state
by DM i, and the strict p nce relations can be repre-
sented by the concept of unilateral improvement (UI) list,
which incorporates preference information into the imme-
diate decision possibilities at any state by DM i. Using set
notation, reachable and UI lists are defined as
Ri sð Þ ¼ s0 2 S : s; s0ð Þ 2 Aif g ð1Þ
Rþi sð Þ ¼ s0 2 Ri sð Þ : s0 i sf g: ð2Þ
[8] Relations (1) and (2) are used to determine the stability
of states. Stability analysis is able to provide a list of
potential resolutions for the conflict under consideration,
indicating where the conflict may settle. However, stability
analysis essentially takes a static approach: it treats each state
separately and examines whether a DM has the incentive to
deviate from a state or not, but it is not concerned with how
the state is achieved or even whether the conflict may evolve
to it. In addition, a status quo state is treated exactly the same
as any other state at this stage. Therefore stability analysis
cannot address concerns about the accessibility of a state
from a given status quo or about evolutionary aspects of the
conflict. Status quo analysis is designed to add a dynamic
dimension to the graph model methodology and to investi-
gate these problems systematically.
[9] To apply the status quo analysis approach given
below, a graph model must be calibrated first. The DSS
GMCR II provides a convenient way to build a graph
model. The analyst identifies the stakeholders holding
decision powers in a conflict, the options available to them,
and the feasible combinations of options, which enables
GMCR II to generate a feasible state list. Relative prefer-
ence rankings and restrictions on transitions between feasi-
ble states for each DM are also a required input. In practice,
the analyst must have the assistance of a domain expert or
must conduct research into the details of the dispute. If
possible, interviews with the stakeholders are preferred so
that first-hand information is incorporated into the model.
When an analyst works with a client to build a model of a
dispute in which the client is involved, 3 hours of
discussions are required to calibrate the conflict model.
Subsequently, stability results can be instantly obtained
using GMCR II, and the client can reflect upon strategic
insights that are gained in order to decide how he or she can
interact with his or her competitors in the best possible way.
[10] Data collection for the graph model is relatively easy
because the data requirements are minimal. For example,
relative preferences can be conveniently elicited by furnish-
ing some simple yes/no preference statements in terms of
options. However, of course, the quality of the model rests
on the quality of the data. If the analyst is unsure of some
information included in the model, sensitivity analysis is
recommended to assess the robustness of predictions.
GMCR II can do this well. In this paper our main purpose
is to introduce status quo analysis and to illustrate it using a
transboundary water conflict. The graph model of the case
study (section 3) was developed earlier, so the modeling
process is described only briefly here. For more details,
readers are referred to Hipel et al. [1997].
2.1. Status Quo Analysis Diagram
[11] The graph model for conflict resolution and its
associated DSS GMCR II constitute an analysis paradigm
for strategic conflicts that has up to now relied mainly on
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stability analysis for its conclusions. In this section, algo-
rithms are proposed to apply another analysis technique,
status quo analysis, to a graph model. Status quo analysis is
dynamic and forward looking, in contrast to stability anal-
ysis, which is static and contingent.
[12] Li et al. [2002] proposed a procedure for status quo
analysis in which an evolution tree from the status quo state
is generated. The strength of this approach is that evolution
paths are directly given in the ‘‘tree,’’ but a particular state
may appear more than once along different paths. Li et al.
[2003] provided another methodology to carry out status
quo analysis, producing a status quo analysis diagram
starting from the status quo and creating a table based on
the diagram; they illustrated the approach by applying it to
an aquifer contamination conflict that took place in Elmira,
Ontario, Canada. Both procedures only permit UIs (all
moves must bring immediate benefit to the movers, in terms
of preferences) when the tree or diagram is generated. Li
[2003] relaxes this constraint, allowing any moves as the
diagram expands from the status quo state. Furthermore,
variations of algorithms are also investigated when the
graph model and/or preferences are transitive. This paper
furnishes a more in-depth description of the algorithms
reported by Li et al. [2003] and applies the algorithms for
the first time to the Flathead River conflict.
[13] A status quo analysis diagram is, in fact, a directed
graph rooted at the status quo state. This diagram takes
states as its basic component and then tracks DMs’ moves
and countermoves via directed arcs joining pairs of states. In
the diagram each vertex stands for a feasible state of the
conflict model, and each arc specifies a legal one-step move
between two states by a given DM. Since a general rule in
the graph model is that consecutive moves are not allowed
[Fang et al., 1993], a move by a DM is regarded as illegal if
it immediately follows another move by the same DM.
[14] The generation of the status quo analysis diagram
starts from the status quo state. At each iterative step the
algorithm determines which states can be reached at this
stage by examining the UI lists of states that are attainable
at the immediate previous step for all DMs. Information
regarding the last mover(s) to a state is also tracked so
that consecutive moves can be screened out and arcs
joining ordered pairs of states can be specified. This
iterative process stops when no more states or arcs are
eligible to be added to the diagram. Algorithm 2.1, which
generates the status quo analysis diagram, is formulated as
follows, where SQ is status quo state, Si
(h) is the set of
states that can be reached from SQ in exactly h UIs, with
DM i as the last mover, V(h) is the set of states that can be
reached from SQ in at most h UIs, and Ai
(h) is the set of
arcs for DM i in the status quo analysis diagram, where
DM i participates in a legal sequence of UIs starting from
the status quo state and the total number of moves is at
most h.
[15] 1. Start from SQ. Let h = 0, Si
(0) = {SQ}, V(0) =
{SQ}, Ai
(0) = , and i 2 N.
[16] 2. Let h  h + 1. Update Si(h), V(h), and Ai(h) as
follows:
S
hð Þ
i ¼ Rþi sð Þ : s 2 [j2NiS h1ð Þj
n o
ð3Þ
V hð Þ ¼ hð Þi [ V h1ð Þ ð4Þ
A
hð Þ
i ¼
A
h1ð Þ
i ; if S
hð Þ
i ¼ ;
A
h1ð Þ
i [ s; s0ð Þ : s 2 [j2NiS h1ð Þj and s0 2 Rþi sð Þ
n o
; otherwise:
(
ð5Þ
[17] 3. If V(h) = V(h1) and [i2NAi(h) = [i2NAi(h1), stop.
Otherwise, return to step 2.
[18] When the termination conditions in step 3 are satis-
fied, let V = V(h1) and A = [i2NAi(h1); then the status quo
analysis diagram is (V, A). Since the diagram includes more
than one DM’s moves, it is recommended that each arc be
labeled with a DM’s name as appropriate. The labels make
it easy to identify evolution path(s).
[19] From the status quo analysis diagram the analyst can
assess the reachability of any state by examining whether it
appears in the diagram: any state in the diagram is attainable
from SQ, and conversely, a state not in the diagram is not
achievable from SQ. In practice, equilibria are of special
interest to the analyst since they usually correspond to
potential resolutions of the conflict, and this feature of the
status quo analysis diagram enables the analyst to evaluate
the accessibility of equilibria, which is generally unavail-
able from the stability analysis. Another significant feature
of the diagram is that often states have incoming arcs but no
outgoing arcs. Such states are called attractors and are likely
to correspond to strong equilibria in the conflict model,
which are equilibria satisfying several solution concepts as
mentioned in section 1. Moreover, if the analyst is interested
in a particular equilibrium, it is possible to identify all
evolution paths to it by tracing arcs in the diagram, thereby
investigating and evaluating DMs’ actions and interactions
along the paths.
2.2. Status Quo Analysis Table
[20] When a model is relatively large with many DMs
and feasible states (for instance, the case study presented in
this paper), the status quo diagram can be quite complicated,
and some key information is not so easy to identify, such as
which states are accessible (i.e., in the diagram) and what
the minimum number of moves to reach a particular
equilibrium is. In addition, sometimes the analyst is inter-
ested only in the accessibility of specific states and the
shortest paths to them. To present some key information
more clearly, an algorithm to create a table based on the
status quo analysis diagram has been formulated.
[21] The status quo analysis table is developed starting
from the status quo state, SQ, and is expanded iteratively. At
step h (h = 0, 1, 2, . . .), the head row gives V(h), the states
that are achievable within h moves from SQ. A cell at the
intersection of row h and a column headed by a particular
state stores the reachability information for this state: if it is
attainable within h moves and the last mover is unique, the
cell contains the last mover’s name or label; if the last
mover can be two or more DMs, a
p
is placed in the cell;
otherwise, the state cannot be reached in h moves, and the
cell is left blank. Let V(h)(s) be the value of the cell in the
intersection of row h and column s, s 2 V(h). Then
V hð Þ sð Þ ¼
p
; if s 2 V hð Þ and two or more DMs may be last mover;
i; if s 2 V hð Þ and DM i is the unique last mover;
; if s =2V hð Þ:
8<
:
ð6Þ
[22] For convenience, let DV(h) = V(h)  V(h1), DAi(h) =
Ai
(h)  Ai(h1), i 2 N, and V(0)(SQ) =
p
. The value for
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any new cell added to the table is set to , and algorithm
2.2 provides a mechanism to update the newly added row
if applicable. A cell with  is left blank in the table.
Algorithm 2.2, which creates the status quo analysis
table, is as follows.
[23] 1. Initiate the table
V hð Þ SQ
V 0ð Þ
p
[24] 2. Let h  h + 1. If DV(h) = , go to step 3;
otherwise, insert one column for each s 2 DV (h), then go to
step 4.
[25] 3. If [i2NDAi(h) = , stop; otherwise, go to step 4.
[26] 4. Insert a new row V (h). For each s 2 V(h), update
cell V(h)(s) as follows:
[27] 4.1. If V (h1)(s) =
p
, then V(h)(s) =
p
.
[28] 4.2. If V (h1)(s) = i, i 2 N, and 9 j 2 N, j 6¼ i, and
s0 2 V (h1), such that (s0, s) 2 DAj(h), then V (h)(s) =
p
;
otherwise, V (h)(s) = i.
[29] 4.3. If V (h1)(s) =  and 9 i1, i2 2 N, i1 6¼ i2, and s0,
s00 2 V (h1), such that (s0, s) 2 DAi1(h) and (s00, s) 2 DAi2(h),
then V (h)(s) =
p
; otherwise, V (h)(s) = i, where i 2 N and
s0 2 V (h1) are such that (s0, s) 2 DAi(h), which must exist
uniquely according to the definitions of DV (h) and DAi
(h).
[30] 5. Go to step 2.
[31] A status quo analysis table furnishes the analyst with
a convenient tool to examine the reachability of any state
from the status quo. If a state is present in the head row, it is
attainable; otherwise, it cannot be attained from the status
quo state. The table also reveals the number of moves in the
shortest path(s) from the status quo to any specified state: if
V(h)(s) is the first nonempty cell in column s, then the
shortest path(s) from the status quo to state s contain(s)
exactly h moves. This information may be of help when the
analyst traces the moves and countermoves of DMs in the
status quo analysis diagram to identify the shortest path(s).
[32] Note that the algorithms described here allow UIs
only, and hence the interpretations apply to UIs only. In
particular, if our analysis reveals that an equilibrium is not
reachable from a status quo, then this equilibrium cannot be
attained through any sequence of UIs. If the restriction to
UIs is dropped and any unilateral move (UM) is allowed,
conclusions about reachability may be different. For algo-
rithms permitting any UM, see Li [2003].
3. Flathead River Water Resources
Management Conflict
[33] The Flathead River flows from southeastern British
Columbia, Canada, into Flathead Lake in Montana, United
States, and eventually into the Columbia River. In 1970 the
Sage Creek Coal Company Limited was established to
develop coal resources along the Flathead River. In 1984,
British Columbia issued an approval-in-principle license for
Sage Creek’s proposal for further development. The conflict
arose because environmental activists and governments on
the U.S. side feared that the proposed expansion of Sage
Creek’s operations would cause significant environmental
degradation and eventually loss of use of the Flathead River,
Flathead Lake, and Glacier National Park. The International
Joint Commission (IJC), plementation body of the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United States
and Canada, commissioned a board of experts to examine the
Flathead River water resources dispute beginning in 1986
[International Joint Commission, 1988]. Meanwhile, Sage
Creek was forming plans for an expanded development, and
British Columbia was considering whether it should accept
the expansion, stand firm, or withdraw its original approval.
[34] A graph model of the Flathead River water resources
dispute, at a point in time just prior to the IJC’s announce-
ment of its recommendations in December 1988, was
constructed by Hipel et al. [1997]. There the DSS GMCR
II was employed to carry out a static stability analysis and to
extract useful equilibrium information conveniently and
expeditiously. Here a new feature of the graph model
methodology, status quo analysis, is applied to the Flathead
River conflict to assess the reachability of the equilibria and
to examine the dynamics of the conflict.
[35] This conflict involves four DMs: British Columbia
government (BC), Sage Creek Coal Company Ltd. (SC),
Montana (MT), and IJC. Table 1 displays the four DMs,
their available options, and the status quo state. A ‘‘Y’’
opposite an option indicates that this option is selected by
the DM who controls it, and an ‘‘N’’ means it is not.
[36] After removing infeasible states, Hipel et al. [1997]
identify the 55 feasible states listed in Table 2. As usual in
the graph model, one can easily identify the pattern of the
feasible states from Table 2. Except for the status quo, state
1, the feasible states can be placed into three groups; each
group corresponds to one of the IJC’s recommendations and
contains 18 states. Although the 55 feasible states listed in
Table 2 are exactly the same as those by Hipel et al. [1997],
the numbering does not completely agree due to the upgrade
of the software package GMCR II.
[37] Once the feasible states and allowable transitions are
identified, the reachable list Ri(s) for each feasible state for
every DM is immediately available from GMCR II. Prefer-
ence rankings over feasible states are required to calibrate a
graph model. The preference information assumed by Hipel
et al. [1997] is shown in Table 3, where states are ranked
from most to least preferred (top to bottom of column,
respectively), with states 2–55 being equally preferred by
IJC. (This would be highlighted in a single color within the
GMCR II environment.) Hence as shown in column 4 of
Table 3, all states are equally preferred for the IJC except
state 1; the IJC prefers to make a decision rather than remain
at the status quo. From SC’s viewpoint the most preferred
Table 1. DMs and Options of the Flathead River Conflicta
DMs and Options Status Quo
Sage Creek Coal Company Limited (SC)
1. Continue: Continue original development Y
2. Modify: Modify to reduce environmental impacts N
British Columbia Provincial Government (BC)
3. Original: Support original project Y
4. Modification: Require modification N
Montana (MT)
5. Oppose: Oppose any development Y
International Joint Commission (IJC)
6. Original: Recommend original project N
7. Modification: Recommend modification N
8. No: Recommend no project N
aSource is the work of Hipel et al. [1997]. ‘‘Y’’ indicates that this option
is selected by the DM who controls it, and ‘‘N’’ means that it is not.
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outcomes involve proceeding with its original project (select
option 1); next SC prefers a modified project (option 2). It is
in SC’s interest that BC approve its original proposal
(option 3) or at least a modified version (option 4) and that
IJC then recommend the original project (option 6) or a
modification (option 7); least important to SC is whether MT
opposes the project (it prefers that option 5 not be selected).
By examining the ‘‘Y/N’’ representation of states in Table 2,
one can identify the pattern of SC’s preference ranking in
Table 3. For a justification of preferences of BC and MT in
the model, see Hipel et al. [1997]. GMCR II [Fang et al.,
2003a] provides two option-based approaches, option
weighting and option prioritization, for eliciting relative
preference ranking over states and contains a direct ranking
tool for fine-tuning preferences. It is worth noting that the
graph model can generally handle both transitive and intran-
sitive preferences, although the DSS GMCR II requires
preferences to be transitive. Transitivity of preferences is
thus assumed for this illustration.
[38] By combining a DM’s reachable list, Ri(s), with the
preferences given in Table 3, DM i’s UI list, Ri
+(s), can be
readily obtained, as shown in Table 4. Note that a dash
indicates that the corresponding list is empty, and subscripts
1, 2, 3, and 4 designate DMs Sage Creek, BC, Montana, and
IJC, respectively.
[39] GMCR II expeditiously calculates the wide range of
stability and equilibrium information shown in Figure 1.
From this output we can see that three states, 15, 37, and 38,
are equilibria under all solution concepts incorporated into
GMCR II. These strong equilibria constitute the most likely
resolutions for the conflict. Some other states, such as 5, 7,
14, 16, 26, 28, 35, and 47, are equilibria but only under the
GMR and SMR solution definitions.
[40] As a follow-up to stability analysis, status quo
analysis is designed to look further into this equilibrium
information by determining which equilibria are reachable
from the status quo state. Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 are applied
to this conflict model next to demonstrate how the algo-
rithms developed in section 2 can be applied in practice to
extract further insights into a conflict model.
[41] Calculations indicate that V(8) = V(7) and Ai
(8) = Ai
(7)
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. According to the termination conditions in
step 3 of algorithm 2.1, the status quo analysis diagram is
given by {V(7), [i2 NAi(7)}, which is shown in Figure 2. The
corresponding table is Table 5. Significant insights can be
gleaned by examining Figure 2 and Table 5. Note that only
UIs are allowed when the status quo analysis diagram is
generated, so the following interpretations are based on this
assumption.
[42] By examining the vertices in Figure 2 or the head
row (column headings) of Table 5, one can easily observe
that only 23 of the 55 feasible states, including the status
quo state 1, may be reached from the status quo. Many of
the weak (GMR and SMR only) equilibria shown in
Figure 1, such as states 5, 7, 14, and 16, are unattainable
from the status quo state. Therefore, although these states
are conceptually stable for all DMs under these definitions,
they could not arise in this model provided that all DMs
take only UIs. One can also easily identify three attractors
(with only incoming arcs but no outgoing arcs) given by
states 15, 37, and 38 in Figure 2; these states are indeed
equilibria under all solution concepts incorporated into
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GMCR II, as disclosed in Figure 1, and hence are most likely
to occur in practice. Our status quo analysis indicates that all
of these potential resolutions are attainable from the status
quo state. Furthermore, when any of these states is attained,
no DM would have the incentive to deviate from it unilater-
ally under the implemented graph model solution concepts.
[43] Theoretically, all possible evolution paths from the
status quo state to any achievable state can be identified by
examining Figure 2. However, the analyst is usually more
interested in the short list of potential resolutions, consisting
of states 15, 37, and 38 in this case study. Furthermore,
among the different paths to a possible resolution, the ones
of greatest interest are those that contain the fewest moves
and hence require less attention from DMs and consume
fewer resources. The status quo analysis diagram and the
associated table provide the analyst with a convenient
vehicle to identify the shortest path(s) to states of interest.
[44] An analyst who is interested in a particular state s
and would like to know the shortest path to it should consult
Table 5. If s does not appear in the head row, then it cannot
be reached from the status quo. Otherwise, look down the
corresponding column and find the first nonempty cell
V(h)(s); the shortest path to state s consists of h moves. In
addition, the last mover i may be identified at the same time
if the entry in the cell is i, i 2 N. Otherwise, at least two
distinct DMs can be the last mover. If the last mover is
unique, this information can help us trace back to the status
quo state and identify the shortest path in the status quo
analysis diagram. For instance, look at state 38 in Table 5.
The first nonempty cell is V (4)(38) = 3, and hence the
shortest path involves four moves, and the last mover is MT
(note that 3 = Montana). By examining Figure 2, the
shortest path, SQ IJC! 51 BC! 48 SC! 47 MT! 38, can then be
identified. Similarly, one can easily find in Table 5 that the
shortest paths to equilibria 15 and 37 contain one and three
moves, respectively. Figure 2 reveals that the shortest paths
are SQ IJC! 15 and SQ IJC! 33 BC! 36 SC! 37, respectively.
[45] If V(h)(s) =
p
, then at least two DMs can take the
conflict to state s in h moves or fewer, and therefore there
always exists at least one exit if there are outgoing arcs from
state s. For example, state V(3)(47) = 1, so the shortest path
to 47 takes three moves, where SC (DM 1) is the last mover,
while V(4)(47) =
p
indicates that at least two DMs may take
the conflict to state 47 in a path of four or fewer moves.
Hence if 47 is not an attractor, as in this case, there always
exists some way out of this state. For example, the status
quo analysis diagram makes clear that MT can always direct
the conflict from 47 to 38, whether it is SC or BC that
causes the conflict to move to 47.
[46] Some more specific features of this conflict model can
also be deduced from the diagram. For instance, there are
three relatively independent branches in Figure 2; each
branch corresponds to one of the three possible recommen-
dations from the IJC and possesses a unique attractor. The
diagram clearly indicates that IJC is the only DM with the
capability to shift the conflict away from the status quo; its
move essentially dictates the resolution of the conflict. If the
IJC supports the original development plan, the conflict will
settle at state 15; if the IJC recommends a modification, the
final resolution is likely to be at state 37; if the IJC’s choice is
no project at all, state 38 will be the final outcome of this
conflict.
[47] Before the IJC discloses its recommendation, the
other three DMs have no incentive to act. Furthermore,
except the branch SQ IJC! 15, which immediately brings the
conflict to a possible resolution, the next DMs who will
move following IJC’s recommendation are BC and then SC.
After IJC makes its recommendation, BC will immediately
respond by modifying its license if necessary, and then SC
will have to update its development plan, thereby conform-
ing to the available license from BC. This finding is quite
consistent with the real-world situation: although IJC’s
Table 3. Preference Rankings for DMs in the Flathead River
Conflict
Sage Creek BC Montana IJCa
6 6 38 2
15 28 47 3
24 38 44 4
33 15 53 5
1 37 41 6
42 47 50 7
51 26 20 8
7 40 29 9
16 35 26 10
25 49 35 11
34 5 23 12
43 39 32 13
52 14 11 14
10 48 2 15
19 7 8 16
28 27 17 17
37 16 5 18
46 36 14 19
55 22 49 20
5 44 40 21
14 31 55 22
23 53 46 23
32 20 52 24
41 46 43 25
50 29 31 26
8 55 22 27
17 45 37 28
26 54 28 29
35 21 34 30
44 30 25 31
53 1 13 32
2 3 4 33
11 41 19 34
20 12 10 35
29 50 16 36
38 43 7 37
47 52 48 38
9 2 39 39
4 42 54 40
3 11 45 41
18 51 51 42
13 4 42 43
12 13 30 44
27 9 21 45
22 25 36 46
21 18 27 47
36 34 33 48
31 23 1 49
30 32 24 50
45 8 12 51
40 17 3 52
39 10 18 53
54 24 9 54
49 19 15 55
48 33 6 1
aStates are ranked from most preferred at the top of the column to least
preferred at the bottom, with states 2–55 being equally preferred by IJC.
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Figure 1. Equilibria for the Flathead River conflict.
e 2. Status quo analysis diagram for the Flathead River conflict.
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recommendation does not bind the DMs, BC will face
substantial political pressure if it does not follow the IJC’s
recommendation. As long as BC modifies its original
license, SC has no choice but to change its plan accordingly.
The response from MT depends on other DMs’ choices. If
any version of the project proceeds, it is in MT’s interest to
maintain its opposition. However, MT’s ‘‘decision power’’
in this model is minimal because in some likely resolutions,
such as 15 and 37, its opposition does not have much
impact as long as BC can tolerate the pressure applied by
the opposition.
[48] As described by Hipel et al. [1997], the historical
outcome is state 38, in which the IJC recommends no
project, and BC and SC are forced to terminate their license
and project; Montana, completely satisfied by this develop-
ment, withdraws its opposition. An ad hoc analysis revealed
a path of transitions from the status quo state to the final
outcome as shown in Figure 3. It is easy to verify that this
transition process is consistent with one of the three shortest
paths in the status quo analysis diagram, SQ IJC! 51 BC! 48 SC!
47 MT! 38. Note that in this path and one other, SQ IJC! 33 BC!
36 SC! 37, BC’s decision to follow the IJC’s recommendation
is largely due to the expected political pressure from the
opposition group because the IJC’s recommendation is not
binding. If BC and Montana could somehow cooperate and
reach an agreement, the resolution would be quite different
from the historical one since the potential political pressure
would be significantly reduced and BC might be able to
withstand other pressures and support either a partial or
even a full project by SC. Therefore SC may exert its
influence to encourage BC to cooperate with Montana,
thereby leading to a more favorable resolution (for SC).
[49] In a conflict environment, resolution requires the
participation of all DMs. Here each DM should maintain
some dialogue channels with other DMs to keep up to date
on other DMs’ concerns and interests. Doing so may
eliminate or reduce costs. For instance, had SC more
quickly understood IJC’s objection to its proposal and
BC’s willingness to follow IJC’s suit (as shown in the
shortest paths to states 37 and 38), SC might have scaled
back its development plans or even halted investment in this
Table 4. Reachable and UI Lists for the Flathead River Conflict
State
s
Sage Creek BC Montana IJC
R1(s) R1
+(s) R2(s) R2
+(s) R3(s) R3
+(s) R4(s) R4
+(s)
1 – – – – – – 15, 33, 51 15, 33, 51
2 3, 4 – 5, 8 5 11 11 – –
3 2, 4 2, 4 6, 9 6 12 12 – –
4 2, 3 2 7, 10 7 13 13 – –
5 6, 7 6, 7 2, 8 – 14 – – –
6 5, 7 – 3, 9 – 15 15 – –
7 5, 6 6 4, 10 – 16 16 – –
8 9, 10 10 2, 5 2, 5 17 – – –
9 8, 10 10, 8 3, 6 3, 6 18 18 – –
10 8, 9 – 4, 7 4, 7 19 19 – –
11 12, 13 – 14, 17 14 2 – – –
12 11, 13 11, 13 15, 18 15 3 – – –
13 11, 12 11 16, 19 16 4 – – –
14 15, 16 15, 16 11, 17 – 5 5 – –
15 14, 16 – 12, 18 – 6 – – –
16 14, 15 15 13, 19 – 7 – – –
17 18, 19 19 11, 14 11, 14 8 8 – –
18 17, 19 17, 19 12, 15 12, 15 9 – – –
19 17, 18 – 13, 16 13, 16 10 – – –
20 21, 22 – 23, 26 26 29 – – –
21 20, 22 20, 22 24, 27 27 30 30 – –
22 20, 21 20 25, 28 28 31 31 – –
23 24, 25 24, 25 20, 26 20, 26 32 – – –
24 23, 25 – 21, 27 21, 27 33 33 – –
25 23, 24 24 22, 28 22, 28 34 34 – –
26 27, 28 28 20, 23 – 35 – – –
27 26, 28 26, 28 21, 24 – 36 36 – –
28 26, 27 – 22, 25 – 37 37 – –
29 30, 31 – 32, 35 35 20 20 – –
30 29, 31 29, 31 33, 36 36 21 – – –
31 29, 30 29 34, 37 37 22 – – –
32 33, 34 33, 34 29, 35 29, 35 23 23 – –
33 32, 34 – 30, 36 30, 36 24 – – –
34 32, 33 33 31, 37 31, 37 25 – – –
35 36, 37 37 29, 32 – 26 26 – –
36 35, 37 35, 37 30, 33 – 27 – – –
37 35, 36 – 31, 34 – 28 – – –
38 39, 40 – 41, 44 – 47 – – –
39 38, 40 38, 40 42, 45 – 48 48 – –
40 38, 39 38 43, 46 – 49 49 – –
41 42, 43 42, 43 38, 44 38, 44 50 – – –
42 41, 43 – 39, 45 39, 45 51 51 – –
43 41, 42 42 40, 46 40, 46 52 52 – –
44 45, 46 46 38, 41 38 53 – – –
45 44, 46 44, 46 39, 42 39 54 54 – –
46 44, 45 – 40, 43 40 55 55 – –
47 48, 49 – 50, 53 – 38 38 – –
48 47, 49 47, 49 51, 54 – 39 – – –
49 47, 48 47 52, 55 – 40 – – –
50 51, 52 51, 52 47, 53 47, 53 41 41 – –
51 50, 52 – 48, 54 48, 54 42 – – –
52 50, 51 51 49, 55 49, 55 43 – – –
53 54, 55 55 47, 50 47 44 44 – –
54 53, 55 53, 55 48, 51 48 45 – – –
55 53, 54 – 49, 52 49 46 – – –
Table 5. Status Quo Analysis Table for the Flathead River
Conflict
V(h)
s
SQ 15 33 51 30 36 48 54 29 31 35 37 47 49 53 55 20 26 38 44 28 46 40
V(0)
p
V(1)
p
4 4 4
V(2)
p
4 4 4 2 2 2 2
V(3)
p
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V(4)
p
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1
p p p p
1 1 3 3 3 3
V(5)
p
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1
p p p p
1 1 3
p p
3 1 1
V(6)
p
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1
p p p p
1
p
3
p p
3 1 1 2
V(7)
p
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1
p p p p
1
p
3
p p
3 1 1 2
Figure 3. State transition from the status quo to the final
outcome. ‘‘Y’’ means yes and ‘‘N’’ means no.
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project, which would have reduced its loss due to later
license cancellation. On the other hand, SC might have
lobbied the British Columbia government, arguing that it is
in BC’s interest to withstand political pressure on this issue.
Had SC done so, BC’s preferences might have been
different, and a different resolution might have emerged.
4. Conclusions
[50] A transboundary river basin conflict involving the
United States and Canada is modeled as a graph model, and
a stability analysis is then carried out by using the DSS
GMCR II. To extract more structural insights, a status quo
analysis is conducted using two recently developed algo-
rithms. This application demonstrates how the reachability
of a state can be easily assessed by using this new approach
and how distinct resolutions may be achieved through
different interactions among DMs. Examination of possible
evolutionary paths leads to a better understanding of how
BC’s reaction to the threat of political pressure from the
United States is a major determinant of the resolution.
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